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This article interprets and analyzes the role of China in and the prospects of 
denuclearization of North Korea. Driven by its ruling party’s peculiar political 
interest of resisting, reducing, and replacing American power at the expense of its 
national interest of cooperating with the United States, Beijing has been alternatively 
facilitating (somewhat) and fettering (mostly) North Korean denuclearization to 
make the cause unavoidably long and arduous, if doable at all. The latest resumption 
of Beijing-Pyongyang ties, in reaction to the Trump-Kim summit, suggests that a 
fundamental change in Beijing’s strategic stance on the North Korean nuclear issue 
has taken place, making genuinely enabling peaceful denuclearization of the DPRK 
rather difficult as it would require literally a political change-of-heart in Beijing.
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Introduction
Many astonishingly dramatic events happened in 2018 involving North Korea 
(DPRK, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea): the leaders of the two Koreas 
held summits and issued joint-declarations, at Panmunjom and later in 
Pyongyang, greeting each other and dinning together like close friends. The 
rather reclusive North Korean leader Kim Jong-un traveled to China three times 
in 100 days to meet Xi Jinping, which, in Xi’s language, rekindled the spirit of 
comradeship and “family-like relations” between Beijing and Pyongyang (Xinhua 
2018). Topping all of that, for the first time ever, the North Korean leader met 
with a sitting president of the United States in Singapore in June 2018 and pledged 
again to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula (Liptak 2018; New York Times 2018). 
The image of Kim Jong-un holding hands with Donald J. Trump, smiling at and 
patting each other, is truly a first-class drama in international relations and public 
diplomacy, something just months ago would be considered impossible by many, 
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if not the majority of, observers.
Theatrics and excitement aside, those events have real meanings. The main 
issue at stake is the all-important denuclearization of North Korea. After the 
Trump-Kim summit, hopes naturally rose for a peaceful resolution of the North 
Korean nuclear issue and also perhaps the overall Korean issue, the remaining 
conflict of the Cold War that was supposedly ended more than a quarter century 
ago. Whether those aspirations will pan out and become reality or join the many 
dashed hopes littering the arduous road to peace in Northeast Asia still remains 
to be seen as of the fall of 2018. The latest developments, however, already tend to 
indicate dimmer prospects for a peaceful and speedy solution. 
This article is an attempt to interpret, analyze, and speculate about the 
prospects of denuclearization of North Korea. More specifically, it attempts to 
analyze why and how China is facilitating or fettering that cause. Trying to go 
beyond the daily occurrences and dazzling words and images, I will mainly focus 
on the key and stable motivational factors behind Chinese action and policy. This 
way, hopefully, the China factor in the whole jigsaw puzzle will become clearer 
and uncluttered. For Beijing, a clear hierarchy of policy preferences exists as 
follows: the political interest of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to 
stay in power forever (a goal that is as distasteful as it is threatening to the West), 
often at the expense of China’s national interest that requires the forging of good 
relations with the West especially the United States; the subsequent Chinese 
policy of resisting, reducing, and replacing the U.S. power in East Asia; to keep 
the Korean status quo; and, finally, then perhaps denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula. 
The China Dream and Beijing’s Stance
With the world’s largest population and foreign currency reserve and the second 
largest economy and military budget, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is 
now consequentially advocating a grand “China Dream” that openly calls for a 
rejuvenation of China’s past power and glory (CCP Central Document Studies 
Bureau 2013; Wan 2013). While the prospects of China’s rise and its future 
actions are both still profoundly uncertain, the PRC state is becoming ever more 
wealthy, powerful, and active, with an ambitious foreign policy typically befitting 
a rising regional superpower with global aspirations (Lampton 2008; Kissinger 
2011; Sutter 2012; Mearsheimer 2014). As indicated by several important 
developments, China is increasingly willing and able on the world stage, 
promising more Chinese demands—China’s new “international security activism” 
(Ratner et al. 2015). Few other countries feel rising Chinese power more acutely 
than China’s immediate neighbors in Northeast Asia, a region that has historically 
shaped today’s China and is currently crucial to China’s security and economy 
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(Smith 2015). However, China (and its treaty ally North Korea) has accumulated 
a significant “deficit of trust” in the region according to Chinese analysts (Shen 
2014). Some have speculated that, in the long run especially, China’s imperialist 
tradition in the region is likely to re-manifest itself (Y. Wang 2010). Some have 
already observed that Beijing is pursuing its own version of the Monroe Doctrine 
in the Western Pacific (Walt 2012). In profound ways, how China deals with its 
neighboring nations shows well the intent and style of its rising power. 
On the ground, China now directly encounters and mightily struggles with 
the powerfully confining East Asian security structure that was born during the 
Cold War many decades ago. The treaty alliances that anchor this structure deeply 
involve the “outsider” of the United States, the main ideological and political 
adversary of the CCP in Beijing. Eternally worrying about regime survival, the 
PRC has thus pursued a top foreign policy objective of resisting and reducing 
the presence and influence of the United States in its neighborhood, even at the 
expenses of China’s national and people’s interest. A manifestation of this has 
been China’s policy toward North Korea and especially the North Korean nuclear 
bomb—it has become a litmus test of the nature and limitation of Chinese power 
for the world to see. Beijing’s failure so far, reflecting its unwillingness more than 
its inability, to stop Pyongyang’s nuclear ambition has epitomized an irony that, 
with its ever-rising power, China’s national security environment and freedom 
of action in East Asia are both stagnant, if not deteriorating. Left alone, the 
North Korean bomb undercuts China’s power and prestige everyday as it poisons 
China–South Korea (ROK, Republic of Korea) and undermines the Chinese 
leadership in the region and beyond, with more and graver uncertainties and 
chain reactions. 
To apply its substantial but likely one-shot power to force a denuclearization 
of the DPRK, China would risk losing its only treaty ally and ideological comrade 
and thus strengthen the hand of the United States—a dreadful blow to the 
CCP regime. The catch-22 predicament Beijing faces in dealing with nuclear 
North Korea, therefore, illustrates the politicized, suboptimal nature of PRC 
foreign policy, which may serve the CCP regime well but at the heavy expense 
of China’s national interest. With the coded declaration of its projective of peace 
and stability in Northeast Asia, Beijing oscillates between pushing Pyongyang 
to denuclearize and accommodating, even rewarding, Pyongyang in opposition 
to the United States. Right after the public announcement about the June 2018 
summit between Trump and Kim but before it actually took place, the somewhat 
dumfounded Chinese government evidently started to swing away from pressing 
the North Koreans. Since June 2018, U.S.-China conflicts over trade, tensions in 
the South China Sea, and, perhaps, also issues regarding Taiwan have all seemed 
to intensify, and Beijing has moved back to its traditional policy of resisting and 
reducing U.S. influence first and pursuing denuclearization in the DPRK second, 
if ever. The high hopes generated by the Trump-Kim summit may subside further 
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should the current warming trends continue between Beijing and Pyongyang. 
Three Alliances in East Asia and China’s Three-Rs Strategy 
Like other powers, China is not pursuing its foreign policy in a vacuum with total 
freedom. The development and action of the many partners, rivals, and especially 
neighbors critically define and shape Chinese foreign policy. The long-lasting 
Cold War era power structure in East Asia remains both the given environment 
that confines the PRC and the natural target for the increasingly revisionist 
projection of Chinese power. Three alliances still constitute the bulk of East Asian 
international relations: the U.S.-ROK alliance, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the 
PRC-DPRK alliance.1 Furthermore, Chinese foreign policy is peculiarly driven by 
two sets of interests that sometimes overlap but are often in serious conflict and 
competition: the national interest of China as a sovereign and growing “normal” 
unit of the Westphalian international system and the political interest of the 
CCP regime as an autocratic and ideologically lonely government. To be sure, all 
states make and implement their foreign policies with the imprint of the regimes’ 
wishes and desires, and regime security is often part of national interests. But the 
foreign policy of the nondemocratic one-party regime of the CCP is particularly 
and rigidly politicized to promote regime survival and security first and foremost. 
The gap, even divorce, between China’s national interests and the CCP’s political 
interests therefore have been profound and consistent.2 The anchoring rivalry and 
animosity between Beijing and Washington/Tokyo stem mostly from the pursuit 
of CCP’s political interest instead of China’s national interest, as the latter does 
not justify the kind of fanned hostility with the United States or Japan. 
A rising power such as China “naturally” develops revisionist demands. 
For any revisionist foreign policy objectives to successfully serve and promote 
Chinese national interests in the region and beyond, China must reckon with the 
three alliances and may or may not seek to alter them in significant ways. The 
United States, the main force behind the restraining East Asian security structure, 
is also the chief ideological and political adversary to the CCP in Beijing. While 
the U.S.-anchored East Asian security framework may be somewhat inconvenient 
but not necessarily obstructing—much less detrimental—to China’s national 
security and economic prosperity, the U.S. presence and leadership embodied 
through this framework always represents a sharp contrast, a stark challenge, and 
an implied mortal threat to the CCP-PRC political system. China’s rise, which is 
heavily shadowed and tilted by the CCP’s political interest, therefore, is naturally 
inclined to be in direct conflict with the United States, especially its presence in 
East Asia.
Structurally, rising Chinese power is thus shaped and confined in East Asia 
by the complex relationship between the PRC and the United States, the world’s 
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two largest and closely-linked economies that have drastically different and 
fundamentally competing political systems. Various speculations are already 
abundant about the future of that relationship, ranging from the so-called 
Beijing-Washington G-2 idea or a “Chinamerica” new world order, to a new 
Chinese rule of the world, to a fierce geopolitical struggle between the United 
States and the PRC first in the Western Pacific, to a coming realization of the 
decades-old prophecies of global clashes between the Western and the Eastern 
civilizations (Huntington 1996; Ferguson 2009; Jacques 2009; Friedberg 2011).3 
In East Asia, however, the linchpin of the consequential PRC-U.S. relationship 
is the Korean Peninsula, on which the three alliances are still facing each other, 
and where Beijing and Washington now share some rare common interests, while 
confronting profound differences and conflicts.
Contrary to some of the conventional wisdom and despite the notoriously 
arcane and opaque nature of Chinese politics, Beijing’s basic strategy toward 
the United States is in fact rather unambiguous: essentially, China eyes the top 
position of global power and leadership currently occupied by the United States 
with a great amount of complex feelings of antipathy, dread, and envy. The deeply 
rooted ideational path and the historical logic of Chinese polity determine that, 
without a sea change of sociopolitical institutions and values at home, the PRC is 
destined to be a lasting rival of and challenger to the United States, and Beijing is 
trying everything to resist, reduce, and replace American power and leadership 
so as to reorder first the neighborhood and then wherever and whenever else 
possible, even if doing so directly opposes China’s national interest (F. Wang 
2012, 2015, 2017). As one senior U.S. official commented in 2015, China and the 
United States are in “different beds with different dreams.”4
To China’s neighbors and the world at large, Beijing’s “three Rs” strategy of 
resisting, reducing, and replacing is likely to constrain significantly international 
cooperation (Foot and Walter 2010). It will increasingly force the nations of the 
world, especially in Asia, to choose sides voluntarily or involuntarily and to settle 
past scores and current and future issues with growing deference to Chinese 
demands and preferences. This three Rs strategy is deeply rooted in the peculiar 
Chinese traditional and ideational foundation for the making of Chinese foreign 
policy. It is also necessitated by the current Chinese politics: the rising PRC needs 
to counter American power so as to safeguard Beijing’s core interest of political 
survival and regime security (F. Wang 2005).5 
China Faces North Korea and Its Bombs
Fundamentally conditioned by the China-U.S. relationship from the very 
beginning, Chinese foreign policy toward the Korean Peninsula in general and 
toward North Korea (and its nuclear program) in particular has been complex 
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and dynamic, yet understandable. With a history filled with discord, dispute, 
and conflict since the early days of the Korean War, North Korea has not been 
a reliable ally for the PRC, let alone a true friend (Shen 2013). As earlier works 
have demonstrated, Beijing has continuously pursued a highly pragmatic, even 
schizophrenically realist policy since the 1990s to gain economic benefits and 
earn external peace while sticking to its clear objective of dealing with the United 
States for political interests (F. Wang 1996, 1997, 1999, 2009). Barring any major 
changes in the China-U.S. relationship and any fundamental changes inside the 
PRC, Beijing is expected to prefer the continued survival of the DPRK regime for 
its political and strategic needs while developing ever-closer relations with the 
Republic of Korea (ROK) for important economic interests and considerations of 
cultivating a counterweight to Japan and the United States. Nominally supporting 
Korean unification, the PRC seeks to maintain the political status quo and realize 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, precisely in that order (Bae et al. 2014; 
Liu, Wang, and Cui 2014).
In the spring of 2016, PRC leader Xi Jinping reaffirmed that for his Chinese 
Dream and Asian Dream, “China would absolutely not allow chaos on the Korean 
Peninsula” (Xi 2016). However, the uncertainties and conflicts of China-U.S. 
relations and China-Japan discord have developed further to profoundly affect 
and reshape China’s strategic calculation about the Korean Peninsula. Beijing 
already appears to have accepted a nuclear North Korea. It may also be willing to 
entertain a Seoul-dominated united Korea if—and its indeed a big if—it is certain 
that a united Korea would be firmly on Beijing’s side in the growing China-U.S. 
rivalry in the region.6 Overall, looking through various lenses, PRC analysts today 
seem to have complex and somewhat diverse views about North Korea, especially 
as a nuclear state, but largely still carefully tread the CCP party line rather than 
China’s national interests (Freeman 2015). The new anger and loud displeasure 
displayed by Beijing in the aftermath of Pyongyang’s defiant test of a “hydrogen 
bomb” in January 2016 and a ballistic missile in March of 2016 have prompted 
Beijing to support more United Nations (UN) Security Council sanctions against 
North Korea but have not moved China any closer to abandoning the DPRK 
regime.7 After the North Koreans defiantly tested more ballistic missiles in the 
spring and summer of 2016, Beijing still seemed to refuse to do the “outsourced” 
work of the United States in compelling Pyongyang, limiting their response to yet 
more angry statements (Huanqiu shibao 2016). 
The same policy continued after North Korea’s fifth nuclear test on 
September 9, 2016. In mid-2017, however, Beijing showed more cooperation 
with the UN sanctions against Pyongyang’s new provocations, likely hoping to 
head off possible use of American military force by a still unpredictable new 
president in the White House. But, as soon as the dramatic Tump-Kim summit 
was announced, Beijing moved openly closer to Pyongyang to regain its balance: 
Xi not only met with Kim repeatedly but also has apparently resumed even 
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increased material support to the DPRK. 
The PRC has been rewarded for its pragmatic Korea policies with great 
strategic maneuverability in its interaction with the United States over how to 
address the provocative moves of the DPRK; considerable international prestige 
for Beijing’s hosting of the multilateral talks about Korean issues, however 
unfruitful those talks may have been so far; and enormous economic benefits 
through its deepening and booming trade and investment deals with South Korea 
to form a great East Asian chain of production that has enabled China’s lucrative 
exports to the United States. Beijing’s acrobatic, multidimensional Korea policy, 
while certainly designed to serve China’s own interests (especially the CCP’s 
political interests), has indeed contributed to the maintenance of the status quo 
on the Korean Peninsula, including the division of the Peninsula and the North 
Korean nuclear program.
Beijing’s recognition of the ROK in 1992 and its rapidly expanding friendship 
and business ties with South Korea ever since, as well as its policy of quietly 
opposing Korean unification, have had their backlashes, though. Necessarily 
squeezed and naturally feeling shortchanged and even let down by their 
Chinese comrades, the DPRK embarked in the mid-1990s on a daring road to 
provocatively yet cleverly acquire nuclear weapons to bolster its regime security 
and bargaining position. North Korean nuclearization has threatened to break the 
international regime of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT), destabilized Northeast Asia by causing uncertainties about Japanese and 
ROK reactions, and alarmed and agitated the United States. It has inevitably 
weakened and harmed the power and national interests of the PRC, which is 
still the only “legitimate” nuclear power in East Asia, and put both the Chinese 
reputation of a peaceful rise and the Sino-DPRK alliance to test. In addition 
to its nuclear ambition, the DPRK has also engaged in numerous actions of 
provocation, such as testing ballistic missiles and shelling South Korea, to make 
noisy demands. All of those are arguably rational for the security and survival of 
Pyongyang’s dynastic regime, but none of them appear to be well-coordinated 
with PRC foreign policy, let alone serving Beijing’s national strategic interests in 
the region, even threatening to undermine CCP’s political interests as well.
In response, Beijing has addressed the development and seized upon the 
opportunity to cultivate a rare but real common strategic interest with the United 
States on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula to strengthen its hand in 
relations with Washington, especially in the difficult years prior to the 9/11 
attacks in 2001. Since then, the distracted United States further allowed and 
assisted the Chinese in recouping and extracting more prestige by gracing the 
many rounds of the Beijing-hosted Six-Party Talks, involving the two Koreas, 
China, Japan, Russia, and the United States (Bajoria and Xu 2013; Arms Control 
Association 2018). North Korea’s desperate and daring defiance has thus provided 
a major stage for the Chinese government to score multilateral diplomacy 
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points, earn international responsibility and leadership credits, and manage its 
relationship with the United States (Snyder 2013; Munroe and Blanchard 2015). 
Nevertheless, despite great fanfare and high hopes, those talks have largely come 
up empty handed and now are practically defunct because China has refused to 
truly pressure Pyongyang to give up its bomb. 
The politically valuable accomplishment of diplomacy in Northeast Asia 
notwithstanding, China as a nation has endured significant costs for the CCP: the 
PRC has been providing massive economic aid to sustain the failed North Korean 
economy, “even as it tightens sanctions on North Korean nuclear programs” 
(Reilly 2014). The largely one-way flow of Chinese resources and, lately, the 
growing commercial deals have had only limited economic returns with even less 
diplomatic gains for China, sometimes not even so much as sincere appreciation 
from Pyongyang.8 With its new bomb, North Korea has become less of an inferior 
partner in the PRC-DPRK alliance and acquired significantly more bargaining, 
even extortion-like, power over Beijing, as some PRC analysts have now openly 
acknowledged.9 Kim’s summits with Trump and ROK President Moon Jae-in in 
2018 further elevated his position. 
More important, perhaps, China’s national interests and even national 
security have in fact suffered despite the rise of Chinese economic and military 
might: China has now become the only country in the world with four nuclear 
powers at its border, and DPRK-initiated nuclear proliferation would further 
undermine China’s power position and freedom of action in East Asia if the 
North Korean nuclear program sets off a chain reaction leading to an arms race, 
even a nuclear arms race, in the region. For Beijing, a nuclear Japan appears to 
be one of the biggest nightmares and perhaps the worst outcome of the DPRK 
bomb. Worse still, China only has the goodwill of the United States to rely on to 
prevent that from happening.10 For all that, it is natural to see that China has been 
increasingly open in words and actions about its deep frustration with nuclear 
North Korea after 2012 when Xi Jinping took over in Beijing (Choo 2013). But 
the political line of the three-Rs strategy against the United States remains clear 
and strong in guiding Chinese policy, even after Pyongyang’s highly irritating acts 
in 2016 and 2017 (Francis 2017). The Sino-North Korean “rekindling” in 2018 
just well-illustrated that point, and demonstrated, once again, the low quality of 
Chinese diplomacy due to the fact that the CCP’s political interest has hijacked 
China’s national interest.  
The China Dilemma: Between the North Korean Bomb and the 
United States
For many years, the Chinese view about the North Korean bomb has been 
fundamentally dictated by the CCP’s political interests and objectives.11 In 
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practice, Beijing is therefore seen wobbling with its ambivalent policy for stability 
of the status quo and also for denuclearization. The shadow of the three-Rs 
strategy is long and dark (Gu 2012). As some PRC analysts have openly argued, 
the North Korean bomb may indeed be “violating China’s wish and interests…
but it is a price [that] must be paid for China to support [North] Korea to oppose 
and check the United States,” since the security threat possessed by the North 
Korean bomb “is much larger to the United States than to China” (Zhou 2010). 
Furthermore, the existence of the DPRK, even nuclear armed, continues to 
provide a strategic buffer between China and the United States and provides, 
more importantly, a “useful bargaining chip in the Sino-American game” as 
Washington “needs Chinese cooperation more” if Pyongyang continues to 
cause more trouble (ibid.). Even though not many Chinese analysts have openly 
embraced the nuclear-stability logic advocated by Kenneth Waltz (2012) in the 
case of Iran, many Chinese do not object to the notion that nuclear weapons in 
the hands of “good people” are not inherently evil. So, the Chinese policy toward 
nuclear North Korea is just “how to control and manage” this strategic asset, 
rather than getting rid of it, let alone at a heavy cost to the CCP/PRC: risking 
the loss of the only treaty ally it has (Zhou 2010). Increasingly discussed behind 
closed doors by those worrying that China might actually be the first and real 
victim of the DPRK bomb or a North Korean nuclear disaster, however, this 
mainstream view remains intact, as the Chinese official media insists cynically 
that the Chinese would not be the “first victims” of the Pyongyang bomb anyway 
(Huanqiu shibao 2016).
Grudgingly, Beijing has grown to “swallow the bitter fruit” and tacitly 
accept nuclear North Korea despite its genuine wish and open rhetoric against 
the DPRK nuclear program, which could enhance the U.S.-Japan alliance and 
even lead to nuclearization of the whole of East Asia.12 As a fellow authoritarian 
regime that went through frightening international isolation and gambled its own 
security and survival on developing nuclear weapons, the CCP/PRC seems to 
have a hard time logically dissuading its North Korean comrades from following 
suit. As the only treaty ally that serves as a useful strategic buffer or asset and 
a rare ideological companion (the only after the U.S.-Cuba rapprochement), 
North Korea’s existence itself is of considerable value to the PRC, especially to the 
CCP rulers in the eternal fight to resist and reduce U.S. power. However, unlike 
most other patron-client relationships, the PRC-DPRK relationship has always 
featured a defiant Pyongyang and a maladroit Beijing. The repeated brutal purges 
of the DPRK top leadership by its ruler, such as the dramatic execution of Jang 
Song-taek in December 2013, have effectively limited, even rooted out, Chinese 
influence in Pyongyang (Rauhala 2013).13 It is often not the dog that wags the tail 
but the other way around in the PRC-DPRK alliance.14 This is indeed a powerful, 
yet under-examined problem—even failure—of China’s over-politicized foreign 
policy. The dramatic events in 2018 further demonstrated Pyongyang’s play of 
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Beijing on the international stage.
Therefore, caught between a rock (the CCP’s political interest in resisting 
the U.S.-Japan alliance) and a hard place (China’s national interest in opposing 
the North Korean nuclear program), Beijing has little choice but to continue its 
seemingly useful policy of milking the situation for as much political gain as 
possible to help its rivalry with the United States and Japan, while leaving the 
status quo of Korean division and the North Korean bomb drifting, hoping for 
the best.15 This is arguably a clever albeit expedient political decision, but it incurs 
considerable and growing costs for China’s national interests, even national 
security, in a rather irresponsible way. China’s freedom of action is also affected, 
as its main geopolitical rival, the U.S.-Japan alliance, gets to make empowering 
moves justified by the North Korean bomb, as reflected by the historic 
“groundbreaking upgrade” of the alliance in April 2015 (USDOD 2015). The 
U.S. “pivot to Asia,” renamed and expanded to be the new Indo-Pacific Priority 
(USDOD 2018), and efforts such as the “U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Dialogue,” 
as well as the upgrades of military technologies by the American and Japanese 
militaries in the Western Pacific, may indeed “put China in an ever-shrinking 
security box” (Zagoria 2012). The upgraded military ties among the United States, 
Japan, and India, exemplified by the Malabar exercises and sharing of military 
technology (Pandit 2014), further altered China’s security environment. The 
decision by South Korea to finally deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area 
Defense (THAAD) systems, especially its X-Band radar in the summer of 2016, 
is just one of such negative consequences Beijing dislikes ardently (Teng 2015; 
Vantage Point 2015; Kang 2016). Even Russia started to offer help with the North 
Korean space program, undermining China’s power over Pyongyang (Morrison 
2015). Rising China is therefore interestingly and unfortunately confined on the 
Korean Peninsula by its only ally’s defiant, desperate, but rational—and seemingly 
effective—drive for regime survival through acquisition of the bomb. In order to 
check the United States, Beijing is now ironically checked by its perceived and 
professed strategic asset. 
Empirically, the PRC keeps on playing its self-anointed role of the mediator 
and its pretended “neutral” role of the host for peace.16 On the one hand, China 
increasingly shows displeasure and disapproval of the North Korean bomb 
by promising more pressure on defiant Pyongyang, especially after the highly 
infuriating North Korean tests in 2016 (Gordon 2014; Kuhn 2016). The PRC 
has indeed made some noticeable and potentially profound new gestures and 
actions: President Xi Jinping took a much-celebrated state visit to South Korea in 
July 2014 to toast the “special” and “traditional” Sino-Korean friendship but has 
largely turned a cold shoulder to North Korean leaders, changing a traditional 
routine of his predecessors who would visit Pyongyang before Seoul.17 
China indeed has significantly more power over North Korea since it is the 
“largest and the dominant” foreign donor and patron (Manyin and Nikitin 2014), 
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literally feeding and fueling the DPRK. Yet, without much genuine confidence 
about Seoul’s future strategic reorientation in the China-U.S. competition as 
the trade-off, and also dreading the consequences of a collapsing DPRK with 
the bomb, Beijing seems to still have no strategic intention or political will to 
really apply its potentially decisive but likely one-shot pressure to seriously 
cripple North Korea into submission on the nuclear issue. Like what happened 
to another former ally, Albania, in the 1970s and 1980s, Beijing’s seemingly 
powerful leverage may well, once applied, have only a one-shot effect and then 
quickly force its beneficiary to run to the enemy’s camp (that of the United States) 
and become an open nemesis at lightning speed (Liu 2015). Indeed, in the spring 
of 2016, some in Beijing already circulated a supposed Japanese report based on 
an alleged DPRK “internal document” showing that Kim Jong-un “now hates 
China more than the U.S. and South Korea” and issued orders to “resist Chinese 
repression policies” (Yue 2016). Enhancing rather than reducing American power 
in Northeast Asia, though it may not negatively impact China’s national interest, 
is categorically unacceptable to the CCP. Once again, the CCP’s political needs 
and calculus dictate Chinese foreign policy. Perhaps also, Beijing seems to know 
what some American analysts have concluded: “North Korea was never serious 
about giving up a nuclear program…that it saw as vital to regime protection and 
internal legitimacy” (Terry and Boot 2015). By mid-2018, Beijing seems to be 
genuinely alarmed by Pyongyang’s possible “defection” to the United States thus 
reversed much of its gestures and actions of pressuring the North Koreans in the 
previous few years. 
On the other hand, the negative consequences brought by the North Korean 
bomb on Chinese national interests and national security are now growing 
and have started to concern the Chinese foreign policy community and the 
increasingly nationalistic Chinese elites at large. It appeared to have then started 
to affect the CCP’s political calculation centered on regime survival and security. 
In 2013, senior Chinese official and analyst Deng Yuwen, who was the deputy 
editor of a major journal of the CCP’s Central Party School, characterized the 
DPRK as the “Kim Dynasty” that is now increasingly a major liability, even a 
lethal danger, for China and called for Beijing to “abandon” Pyongyang in favor 
of denuclearization and Korean unification.18 Despite that such views are in fact 
widely shared inside China, however, Beijing still curbs them publicly, in this case 
by penalizing Deng with a paid suspension (Perlez 2013). Nevertheless, Deng 
(lately a member of an “unofficial” think tank in Beijing) continued to publish 
overseas about a pending collapse of the DPRK in ten to fifteen years (Deng 2016). 
Such occasionally open expression of harsh Chinese views, effective or not in 
influencing Pyongyang, signifies the mood in Beijing. Of course, all that “new 
thinking” has now appeared to come to a halt when Kim Jung-un and Donald 
Trump shared the spotlight. The CCP’s political interest, when it feels affected, 
takes over rather quickly. Beijing has essentially decided, once again, to urge the 
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United States, and its allies, to also accept North Korea’s nuclear status and ideally 
share the Chinese burden of financially sustaining the DPRK so as to, hopefully, 
buy possible denuclearization or at least nonproliferation and continue the status 
quo on the Korean Peninsula (Tiezzi 2014, 2015). 
To pursue the CCP’s political interest and China’s national interest, which 
are in conflict with regard to the issue of North Korean nuclear program, Beijing 
is visibly frustrated but continues to support Pyongyang (Ryall 2014). This is 
especially true since China is yet to achieve its much craved status of “Rich 
Country and Strong Army” so as to rid the CCP of its eternal fear of regime 
nonsurvival (Hu 2011). Stuck in its endless struggle to resist, reduce, and replace 
American power and American leadership, Beijing thus ironically allows and 
even finances the North Korean bomb, canceling much of the geopolitical 
gains made by the prosperous Chinese economy and the rapid buildup of 
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in East Asia. New ideas are often simply 
suppressed. For example, senior government analysts in Beijing have already 
openly warned against people who “use the [North] Korean issue” to smuggle 
in and instigate “a color revolution in China” (Ren 2014). The fear of Pyongyang 
somehow “defecting” to the U.S. camp hangs over Beijing all the time. The CCP 
appears to be afraid that an honest and thoroughly nationalist reexamination of 
China’s failed policy on the North Korean bomb and criticisms of its Pyongyang 
comrades may start and inflame a nationalist political movement in China 
to threaten the party’s rule. Therefore, the CCP leadership has rationally and 
even craftly set a mainly expedient and reactionary policy toward the North 
Korean bomb, which is also clearly suboptimal to China’s national interests. Its 
shortcomings and failures can be amply seen in China’s reactions to the North 
Korean diplomatic successes in 2018. 
Conclusion
Just like elsewhere, such as in sub-Saharan Africa where there seems to be a 
costly and consequential split in Chinese foreign policy between China’s national/
people’s interest and Beijing’s political interest (Wang and Elliot 2014), on the 
Korean Peninsula there is also an impact on Chinese diplomacy from a divorce 
between China’s national interest and the CCP’s core mission of regime survival. 
Nourished by the surging calls of the PRC statist nationalism or patriotism, 
rising Chinese power is already seen exercising “new” leadership in East Asia 
as part of the overall strategic game with the United States. The CCP hopes to 
reduce and replace the dreaded American power in the region through acquiring 
deference and submission based on fear or courting to be generated by achieving 
power parity, even superiority, in the region versus the United States. This is 
further powered by the “important decision to build China into a great maritime 
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power” made by the CCP leadership—an unspecified but grand new plan for the 
expansion of Chinese maritime presence and power (CCTV 2013). An outspoken 
spokesman of the PLA openly declared that the PRC must build up its military 
power as fast as it can so to “make foes suffer and give friends goodies” and that 
“only when we are not afraid of the United States anymore, other nations will 
then be afraid of us.”19 
Unfortunately, however, China’s only treaty ally has come into the middle 
of that grand strategy for its own political interest. Nuclear North Korea has 
compromised Beijing’s new position of power and leadership. Between the North 
Korean nuclear bomb and the United States, Beijing has so far largely chosen 
Pyongyang, however resentfully, compromising and undermining its new power 
and freedom of action at the expense of China’s national interests. Without a 
major political change in China that lessens the CCP’s dictation of Chinese 
foreign policy or a major geopolitical shift such as a realignment in Northeast 
Asia, Beijing will continue to walk the tightwire of keeping nuclear North Korea 
safe while dealing with the United States to hopefully deter Pyongyang’s further 
nuclear ambitions and especially prevent a chain reaction that may lead to a 
nuclear Japan. Total denuclearization of the DPRK now appears to be realistically 
a low priority for Beijing, even though Beijing still repeats its wishes for 
denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula peacefully. Kim Jong-un’s latest diplomatic 
breakthroughs have, so far, become good examples of the tail wagging the dog in 
the PRC-DPRK relationship.
In the future, the overlap of China’s national interests and the CCP’s political 
interest with regard to the North Korean bomb may re-emerge and grow to 
prompt more effective Chinese efforts to preserve the NPT and denuclearization, 
provided that the expedient intersection of U.S. and Chinese diplomatic 
objectives continues, Beijing’s dread over U.S. advances in the region subsides, 
and Pyongyang overplays its hand. A window of opportunity still exists, and may 
even widen, for concerted action by the United States and China to seriously 
control the situation and to eventually get rid of the festering nuclear issue in 
Northeast Asia so as to prevent a nuclear chain reaction, which would be contrary 
to both American and Chinese interests. Yet, in reality, Beijing’s deeply harbored, 
politically-driven three-Rs strategy against the United States is preventing full 
and effective Sino-American cooperation to resolve the Korean nuclear issue. 
The PRC seems determined to have a win-win for itself: to prevent nuclear 
proliferation and a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia while continuing to resist 
and reduce American power through rebalancing and enhancing its ties with 
Pyongyang so as to “deepen cooperation” with its ideological comrade (Guo and 
Lu 2015). Washington may also accordingly be contemplating using Pyongyang 
as a new leverage in dealing with the rising Chinese challenge in the region 
and beyond (Fingar 2017). This U.S.-China strategic rivalry, interestingly and 
profoundly, may end up ironically prolonging the DPRK nuclear program thus 
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opposing their shared interest of denuclearizing Korean Peninsula. A small power 
can indeed survive and even get its way between the two competing giants.  
A diminution, even dismantling, of the U.S.-ROK alliance—such as the 
idea proposed by some South Korean analysts “to limit the strategic flexibility 
of U.S. forces stationed in South Korea, the most sensitive issue to China, to the 
objective of maintaining peace on and stability of the Korean Peninsula” (Chung 
2015)—and a new PRC-ROK united front (first in the name of “against Japan”) 
may effectively encourage many inside the PRC to adopt a new policy toward 
the DPRK and persuade Beijing to get serious about the North Korean bomb 
and even support ROK-led Korean unification. But, just as there are significant 
doubts about and opposition to rapid Korean unification inside and outside of 
South Korea itself (Terry 2014; Delury and Moon 2014), profound questions 
remain about if, what, and how the South Koreans would ever be willing to pay 
Beijing for getting rid of the North Korean bomb. An evident chain reaction 
sparked by the North Korean bomb, such as serious attempts by Japan to follow 
suit, would also powerfully alter Beijing’s rationale. Much, of course, depends 
still on what transpires in China-U.S. relations.20 To the Chinese, the question 
is not if or whether the PRC should or would abandon North Korea—it is just 
a matter of right price and right timing (Zhou 2010; Perlez 2014). The CCP’s 
political interests, rather than China’s national interests, are the main—even 
sole—criterion. A keen observer noted in 2015 that nuclear North Korea, with 
its concerted efforts to develop effective delivery systems such as submarine-
launched ballistic missiles, has already infringed on China’s “core interests,” 
including its political interest of regime survival and security and may thus 
change the game to cause Beijing to alter its failed policy toward Pyongyang (Xu 
2015). 
It is clear that nuclear DPRK has indeed cost China in terms of its national 
interest and national security but has so far had a relatively light impact on the 
real core interest of PRC diplomacy: the political survival and power of the CCP 
served by the pursuit of the three-Rs strategy against the United States. If and 
when Beijing deems that the damages caused by the North Korean bomb to 
Chinese national interests and national security start to impair the CCP regime 
and reduce, even cancel, the payoffs from upsetting and costing the United States 
in the region, China may then be fully expected to deal with North Korean 
denuclearization more seriously and aggressively. The catch is that, by that time, 
it may be way too late already, and the nuclear chain reaction may have already 
taken place in East Asia (Jun 2016).
For Beijing, there is the danger that the North Korean nuclear issue may 
get out of control given the inevitable misperceptions and miscalculations that 
have abundantly colored the history of East Asian international relations over the 
past century. If push comes to shove, an externally forced denuclearization could 
drive a desperate regime in Pyongyang to do desperate things, with uncertain 
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but likely grave consequences for China’s national security, economic prosperity, 
and ultimately the CCP’s power.21 In that sense, nuclear North Korea may have 
already acquired significant deterrence against and meaningful confinement of 
the mighty rising China, with just six nuclear tests and some rudimentary bombs 
and missiles (Perlez 2017). Chinese analysts have indeed acknowledged that 
and have started to suggest to Americans as well that they “treat the DPRK as a 
[legitimate] nuclear power” in any future denuclearization talks.22 Underneath 
the warming of the Beijing-Pyongyang traditional relationship in the aftermath 
of the Trump-Kim summit is the same motivational factors driving China’s policy 
towards the Korean nuclear issue, especially the CCP’s three-Rs strategy against 
the United States. The ongoing cross-Pacific trade war and the heating up of other 
Sino-American disputes such as the Taiwan issue and the tensions in the South 
China Sea are likely to enhance and solidify Beijing’s non-cooperative policy on 
the Korean nuclear issue and also on Korean unification (Bradsher and Myers 
2018). Beijing’s ambivalent and hesitant attitude as well as empty words about 
the two Koreas’ latest declared intention to end the Korean War, for example, are 
quite telling. 
Alternatively facilitating and fettering, Beijing’s role is sure making North 
Korean denuclearization unavoidably long and arduous, if doable at all. Indeed, 
many in the United States, including the White House, have now openly 
expressed the view that the peaceful denuclearization of North Korea is hindered 
heavily by the Sino-American sparring over a rather broad spectrum of disputes 
and conflicts (Trump 2018). Given what has been analyzed in this article, a 
fundamental change of Beijing’s strategic stance on the North Korean nuclear 
issue to genuinely facilitate a peaceful solution is rather unforeseeable as it would 
require literally a political change-of-heart in Beijing. Christopher Hill, a former 
top U.S. diplomat deeply involved in the issue before, now observes, “the wheels 
have come off whatever was agreed to or understood between North Korean 
leader Kim Jong Un and U.S. President Donald Trump in Singapore” and, “as 
a consequence, a bitter irony of the U.S. initiative has been a Chinese-North 
Korean rapprochement of the kind that hasn’t been seen in a decade” (Hill 2018). 
Victor Cha, another former senior U.S. diplomat on Korea, simply asserts that 
the North Koreans “are getting everything they want right now” mostly thanks to 
China’s reopening of trade with the DPRK, without giving up their bombs at all 
(Luce and Dilanian 2018). Unwilling (or unable) to genuinely force Pyongyang to 
denuclearize, Beijing is more than willing and able to spoil the effort for sure.
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Notes
1.  The Beijing-Pyongyang military alliance is based on the PRC-DPRK Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty, first signed in 1961, automatically renewed 
twice, and is currently effective until 2021.
2.  For how the CCP repeatedly ceded Chinese territories for its regime survival and 
security, see Fravel (2005). For how the Chinese foreign policy has always been shaped by 
the CCP’s domestic political agenda, see Garver (2016).
3.  For an Asian optimistic view, see Boon (2013).
4.  Author’s interview in Washington, May 2015.
5.  Top PRC diplomats openly declare that China’s main foreign policy goal is indeed to 
safeguard its political system. Dai Binguo quoted in Li (2009); also see Yi Wang (2013).
6.  Author’s interviews with Chinese officials, officers, and scholars, 2012-2014.
7.  For example, Beijing reportedly lobbied Washington to lift the new sanctions so as 
not to really crush the North Koran economy (Nichols, Charbonneau, and Pearson 2016).
8.  Author’s interviews of Chinese diplomats and officials, 2012-2013. PRC citizens have 
also started to complain openly about this: for example, Si (2010).
9.  Huanqiu shibao (2013); author’s interviews with Chinese analysts, 2016.
10.  Author’s interviews of Chinese analysts and officials in 2010-2015.
11.  For an example of mainstream Chinese views, see Li (2014); Cao (2014); and H. 
Wang (2015).
12.  Author’s interview of a Chinese senior military analyst, 2013.
13.  Jang was rumored to be colluding with Beijing to plot against Kim Jong-un.
14.  For an analysis of how North Korea has cleverly and effectively bargained and 
balanced against China in the post-Cold War era, see Pardo and Reeves (2014).
15.  To a lesser extent, similar resistance to and accommodation of the hegemon by the 
rising powers are identified with regard to the Iranian nuclear issue (Pieper 2014).
16.  Beijing has constantly tried to persuade Seoul to hold summit talks with Pyongyang 
to stabilize the situation, for example, as revealed by former ROK president Lee Myung-
bak’s memoir published in early 2015 (Choe 2015).
17.  North Korea Network Expert Panel (2014). Yet, Beijing dispatched Liu Yunshan, a top 
leader, to attend Pyongyang’s big celebration for its party’s seventieth birthday the next year 
(Fenghuang xinwen 2015).
18.  Deng (2013). Several Chinese analysts the author privately interviewed in 2013 and 
2014 “agreed fully” with Deng, although some thought Deng had “just jumped the gun.”
19.  PLA Navy major general Yang Yi quoted in Liu (2012).
20.  The United States, especially Congress, seems to be developing more new suspicions 
about Beijing regarding the latter’s NPT commitment. See Mufson (2015).
21.  Chinese officials have started to openly voice this concern (Fu 2016).
22.  Senior Chinese scholars and military analysts, speaking at the U.S.-China Seminar on 
Chinese Nuclear Perspectives, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 
May 12, 2015.
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